



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

(as natural science uses the term), or it is not. If it is, it needs no apology; if it is not, it *has* no 'biological function,' and its use as a cloak to cover the biologist's ignorance of evolutionary processes is unjustified. Functions mind may still have, but not of the biological sort.

Secondly, the method gives no systematic account of its functions. Consciousness, it affirms, is full of 'acts' and 'activities,' but it fails to organize these. Attention is, to be sure, an 'organizing activity,' engaged in the 'double process of pulling apart and putting together,' but interest, also, 'represents the spontaneous, dynamic side of our psychical make-up;' and, again, the self is 'the knower annealing the various elements of our experiments into some sort of unity,' while 'will' is 'the whole mind active.' What, now, are the interrelations of all these sovereign powers? and how are attention, interest, and the rest, related to such functions as perception, reasoning and imagination, and also to *their* functions? Some principle of classification and subordination there must be in a psychology which treats consciousness as organic; something better, I mean, than the traditional knowing, feeling and willing, or the 'three ultimate modes of being conscious of an object.' Is it to be found in the work which consciousness does? in the objects with which it has to do? or in the natural history of the developing mind itself? Surely, a definitive account of mental functions and their genesis cannot be given without some principle which shall insure organic coherence and organic unity to the multitudinous 'activities' that mind reveals.

I have already referred to the wide welcome which Professor Angell's text-book has received. This welcome is sufficient evidence, not only that a book of the character was needed, but also that the author has been successful in his attempt to satisfy the need. Its sanctions for success are not hard to find. Its author is both psychologist and teacher; it is well and attractively written; it fills a place not otherwise filled in the literature, and it appeals to a dominant interest in the student of life and of human nature. Where I have criticised it has been criticism of standpoint and of method. I have only praise for the clear, straightforward and sincere development of the doctrine of consciousness considered as a phenomenon of life.

I. MADISON BENTLEY.

Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, written by many hands and edited by James Mark Baldwin. Vol. 3. Bibliography of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognate Subjects, compiled by Benjamin Rand. The Macmillan Co., New York; Macmillan & Co., London. In two parts. 1905. Price \$10. pp. xxv, 542; vii, 543-1192.

The long-awaited bibliography which forms the third and concluding volume of Baldwin's *Dictionary* appears in two parts, bound uniformly with the first two volumes, approximating them in bulk (1192 as against 1536 pp.), and costing together as much as they cost at the date of their first issue. A Prefatory Note by the general editor states that the bibliographical lists extend to 1902. The compiler's Preface indicates the sources, aims and scope of the work.

"The book as a whole is entitled a 'Bibliography of Philosophy,'"—so the compiler begins, in opposition to his title-page,—"and it will be found to comprise a series of bibliographies, including the History of Philosophy, Systematic Philosophy, Logic, Ästhetics, Philosophy of Religion, Ethics and Psychology." "Between the methods of a complete compilation and of a descriptive commentary of philosophical works a golden mean has been sought. On the one hand the bibliography, though not exhaustive, aims to be comprehensive in its scope. From beginning to end the endeavor has been to

preserve in the amount of material as governed by a work of the present size the relative importance of authors and subjects. On the other hand the absence in the bibliography of explanatory comment on books has been compensated for, it is hoped, by the numerous references to important critical reviews of them by specialists." "Readiness of use, especially for the uninitiated, is an essential in a bibliography. For this reason the philosophers . . . have here been brought together in a single alphabetical order. Likewise in the various systematic bibliographies the authors under the systems and special topics, as well as these topics themselves, will be found in alphabetical arrangement." The work contains the titles of "possibly sixty thousand or more volumes and articles."

One can have nothing but sincere admiration for the pluck and determination with which the compiler has carried through his stupendous task. He has carried it through, apparently, without clerical assistance, without financial support, and practically without expert advice. "More than a decade" of "single-handed and self-supported endeavor" has been spent upon it; "the entire work has been accomplished in the Harvard University Library," the courtesy of whose officers is acknowledged in a foot-note; and the same foot-note limits the expert aid to "suggestions on classification received from Professors J. Royce and H. Münsterberg, and linguistic corrections from Professor L. Wiener." Truly, a stupendous task,—and a task whose reliable performance must be of inestimable benefit to students of philosophy and psychology. I know, only too well, the amount of time and trouble required for the making of even a very minor bibliography; and, looking at these two volumes, I am inclined to withhold every word of criticism, and simply to express appreciation of Dr. Rand's achievement.

Nevertheless, criticism must be called to its work; for the bibliography is to be used. In the following notes I have confined myself almost entirely to *Bibliography G, Psychology*, the concluding section of the whole: it is only for this section that I can claim competence.¹ This restriction is, however, the less important since the compiler declares that "a bibliography is a growth, and in fullness of detail and in accuracy this work will be found to improve as it advances." We may, therefore, fairly take the final lists as a sample of the work at large.

What are Dr. Rand's canons? "The names of philosophers are printed in full and in the language of the country to which they belonged" (*sic*). I turn to Wundt (535), and I find "Wundt, Wilhelm." Again: "The titles of books are printed in full in the language in which they first appeared." Did, then, Berkeley publish in 1709 a work entitled "Theory of Vision" (120,926)? Did he publish in 1710 "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge" (120) or "A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge" (926)? Did Bonnet write an "Essai de psychologie" (128) or an "Essai de psychologie, ou considérations sur les opérations de l'âme" (927)? Did Darwin write a work entitled "The Origin of the Species" (929)? I had thought it was "On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for

¹There is, in the make-up of Pt. i, a blemish so obvious that one is astonished to find it escaping the notice of compiler, general editor, and printers. It is the absence of indication, in the headlines, of the particular philosopher under review or of the letter of the alphabet with which his name begins. The pages are headed, simply, "History of Philosophy"—"Philosophers." Suppose, then, that one is looking up, say, Cicero. One guesses at the place of the C's, and opens the book. Having opened it, one may have to turn over several pages before one finds the name of any philosopher. Having found some one, C or not-C, one has to turn back or forth until Cicero appears. Could anything be more awkward?

Life." I had thought, also, that the work here described as "The Descent of Man" (929) was published under the title "The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex." Locke, so far as I know, did not publish "An Essay concerning the Human Understanding" (939). But, indeed, the compiler takes no thought of articles, whether they shall be retained or whether they shall be omitted. Baldwin is accredited with a "Mental Development in the Child and Race" (925: here the elision of an article has carried with it the omission of "Methods and Processes"). The work which Hume published in 1748 was called "Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding," not "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding" (935: cf. 271). James, in 1892, published a "Text-book of Psychology," not a "Psychology" (936). Paulhan, knowing something of French, did not write a book entitled "Les intellectuelles types" (941), but rather "Les types intellectuels. Esprits logiques et esprits faux." And so on.

I pass to mistakes of another sort. Brentano's *Psychologie* (927) should have been given as Vol. I. Cousin's *Elements of Psychology* is said in one place (929) to have been translated by C. S. Henry in 1824; in another (159), to have been translated by C. G. Henry in 1834. Destutt de Tracy is misspelled as Tracey on p. 930. Here his *Éléments* is said to have appeared first in Italian, 1817-1819, and to have come out in French in 1825-1827; p. 180 tells us that the date of the first French edition is [1801]-1818, and that of the second 1824-5, while nothing is said of the Italian; p. 837 dates the two first (and French) editions 1817-18, 1824-25. On p. 927 van Biervliet's initials are given as J. I. instead of J. J. Elsenhars (931) should be Elsenhans. Ebbinghaus' *Psychologie*, i, is said (931) to have 194 pp. in the first edition; it has 694. Jodl's *Psychologie* of 1896 is said (936) to have appeared in two volumes. Lindner's *Empirical Psychology* was translated by C. de Garmo, not by A. J. de Garno (939). I did not, in 1891, speak of Professor Münsterberg as Dr. H. v. Münsterberg (941). Professor Karl Pearson figures on p. 942 as Pierson. Sully's *Human Mind* has two vols., not one (947); and the 501 pp. belong to the first vol. Dr. Aars is not named Aars-Kristian (950). Helmholtz' initials are H. L. F., not H. (955). Helmholtz did not write a *Handbuch der Physiologie*, Bd. iii, Thl. i, 1879; nor does the corresponding portion of Hermann's *Handbuch* say anything about hearing (1145). The Lipps who did *not* write a *Grundthatsachen* (but a *Grundtsachen*) des Seelenlebens is also innocent of the *Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik*, ascribed to him on p. 1180. And so on, again.

I shall not, I hope, be accused of egotism if I allude to Dr. Rand's treatment of my own publications. If they are worth cataloguing at all, they are worth cataloguing accurately. The translation of Wundt's *Vorlesungen* is not mentioned on p. 535; in the *Addenda et Corrigenda* it is given under the date 1905. It appeared in 1894. On p. 963 I am said to have published a physiological vocabulary. On p. 914 my *Primer* is dated back from 1898 to 1892. I do not find that any translation of my books is mentioned, though (according to the Preface) "of the modern translations, English, German, French and Italian are regularly given, owing to their greater accessibility: other languages are, nevertheless, largely included." My initials are given, p. 963, as L. B. On the same page, I am reported as publishing, in 1901, an *Experimental Psychology* of 200 pp. In reality, I perpetrated in that year two volumes, with a much longer title, the one of 214, the other of 456 pp. "Dreams of Tasting" (1039) is not the title of a little paper which I published in 1895. My *Outline* did not reach a

twelfth edition in the year after its first appearance (1136). Perhaps in order to compensate for all these sins of omission and commission, the compiler ascribes to me (1183) a work entitled *The New Psychology*, and published in 1897. I did not write it.

That a good deal of the above criticism refers to trivial points I shall not attempt to deny. What I affirm is that there are too many lapses of the sort specified. "In addition to the task of compilation," Dr. Rand informs us, "much labor has been expended upon the work of verification." And again: "During the past three years the author has given almost exclusive attention to the task of verification." Such attention ought, one would think, to have eliminated even printer's errors of the more glaring sort; it should at least have eliminated most of the bibliographical mistakes that I have pointed out. And these are but a tithe of the mistakes that I have noted.

There remains, behind all this criticism of detail, the fundamental question of the adequacy of Dr. Rand's work. Apart from these slips, is the bibliography comprehensive? may the student rely upon it? is it representative? I take the first group under *Bibliography G*, the group of psychological bibliography. Here the student of psychology is to find his working bibliographies. Well! we remark at once that the three yearly bibliographies of the *Zeitschrift*, the *Psychological Review*, and the *Année psychologique* are all duly mentioned. We notice, too, such obvious items as Dessoir's bibliography of hypnotism and the work of Ueberweg (spelled Ueberwegg). It is a little surprising, however, to find that the only personal bibliography is Wilson's list of the writings of G. S. Hall. Might we not expect a mention of the Fechner bibliography appended to Wundt's edition of the *Psychophysik*? Again: if it was worth while to mention the half-dozen pages on literature in Kuelpe's *Grundriss* (the pages quoted on p. 913, by the way, refer to the translation, and not to the original), would it not have been in place to cite the long chapter on the historical development of psychology in Villa's *La psicologia contemporanea*, 1899? Why should Foster's brief bibliography of sleep be cited, when no reference is made to the bibliographies of Manacéine, to which Foster acknowledges his indebtedness? The question is the more pertinent, since on p. 1037 Manacéine's bibliographies (there is the usual printer's error in the author's name) are specified in some detail. The *Literaturverzeichniss* in Jodl's *Lehrbuch* is mentioned; but the twenty-page bibliography by Spiller is not,—the *Mind of Man* appeared in 1902, not in 1903 (p. 946),—nor the twelve-page bibliography of Calkins' *Introduction*. The choice of text-books is curious. Jodl's *Lehrbuch*, Kuelpe's *Grundriss*, Münsterberg's *Grundzüge*, Sanford's *Experimental Psychology*, Sully's *Human Mind*, even my own *Primer* are quoted; but will it be believed that James' *Principles* and Wundt's *Grundzüge* are omitted? So with special bibliographies: we find references to taste and smell, to vision, to combinational tones (this last given as in the seventieth volume of the *Philosophische Studien*), and so forth; we do not find Bentley's or Kennedy's bibliography of memory, or Kinnaman's bibliography of lifted weights, or my own bibliography of the optical illusions. Nichols' *Review of Recent Literature on the Perception of Time* finds a place; not so the historical section of his earlier work on the *Psychology of Time*. Finally—to make an end—the bibliography of optics in Helmholtz' *Handbuch* should, of course, be credited to König.

The bibliographical section which I have thus passed under review occupies a page and a half of Dr. Rand's text. I shall not pursue the matter further. Enough has been said to show the character of the work, so far as concerns psychology. I sincerely hope that the parts

of the two volumes which I have not examined are more nearly adequate and more carefully revised than those which I have read. Otherwise, I fear that Dr. Rand will have labored in vain,—unless, indeed, he is content to have his pages serve simply as rough copy for future bibliographers.

E. B. T.

L'Ame et le Corps, par ALFRED BINET. Bibliothèque de philosophie scientifique. Ernest Flammarion, Paris, 1905. pp. 288.

The contents of this work are, in sum, the following:

Book I, *Definition of Matter*. Of the material world we know nothing but our sensations. As all sensations are alike mediated by the nervous system, it is impossible to make a distinction and regard certain of them only as objective, *e.g.*, those of touch, vision and the muscular sense, while regarding others as merely subjective. The mechanical theory, therefore, which finds a specially objective significance in movement, has only the value of a symbol. Elsewhere Binet characterizes it as a species of fetchism (p. 227).

Book II, *Definition of Mind*. Instead, however, of drawing the 'idealistic' conclusion that all material phenomena are states of consciousness, Binet draws the opposite conclusion, namely, that the contents of all sensations are physical, *i.e.*, material, phenomena. From the content he distinguishes, as the mental side of the complex fact, the act of cognition. The same analysis applies to images and ideas (conceptions) which are derived from sensation, and it would also apply to emotions, desires, appetites, etc., but for the suspicion that the theory which reduces all these to sensations (objects) is too simple and artificial. The fundamental relation is not that of subject-object, for the subject is really an object; the subject term is replaced by the 'act of cognition.' The relation of cognition to objects is purely contemplative, it is only a consciousness; nothing is added by the categories of the understanding; relations cognized, resemblance, for instance, are physical properties. While consciousness is inseparable from objects, objects may continue to exist without consciousness; the unconscious is merely the unknown which can or could be known under certain conditions. The only bond capable of connecting different mental states is the material. As sensations and images or ideas are material elements, psychology, paradoxical as it may seem, is a science of matter, the science, namely, of a portion of matter having the property of preadaptation (p. 181).

Book III. *The Union of Soul and Body*. The problem of the union of mind and matter is not the problem of two heterogeneous things, the direct relation between which is incomprehensible. The relation is rather that of form (consciousness) and matter (content, sensation, object), as Aristotle taught. The difficulty is not to unite, but to separate them. The separation is found in the incompleteness of the life of consciousness; consciousness requires matter as its correlate, whereas matter does not so require consciousness. The genesis of consciousness cannot be explained; it has equal rights with matter. These principles serve for the criticism of the current theories of spiritualism and idealism, materialism and parallelism. The hypothesis of the relation of soul and body has to satisfy, in particular, two conditions: (1) the manifestations of consciousness are determined by processes in the brain, and (2) of these its immediate conditions consciousness is absolutely ignorant. Binet's hypothesis is as follows: The effect (neural wave) contains, or has inscribed on it, or is the depositary of, the totality of the physical properties perceived in the cause (object). This is an 'absolute certainty.' But the undulation contains, besides the qualities it receives, qualities it itself contributes. To these last, however, as the relatively constant factors, con-